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Misleading Advertising: Prevent or Punish?I
Patrick Fitzgerald*
"Promise, great promise," said Dr. Johnson, "is the soul of
advertisement." But what if the promise isn't kept? What sort
of crime is that? No crime at all, at common law. The common
law allotted promises and their breach not to the criminal law
but to the law of contract. More important still, the law saw the
problem of advertising as part of a wider problem to be solved
not by law but by a different institution - the market.
The problem of advertising, after all, is one special facet of
the conflict between seller and buyer.' According to orthodox
economic theory each seeks to maximise his own interest - the
seller to get the highest price, the buyer the best buy. Hence the
need for advertisement. For the seller must maximise his
persuasion of the buyer, while the buyer must maximise his
information about the product. As one writer observes, "the
conflict between the seller and the buyer becomes clear: the
former must, within the bounds of truth, make claims which
will result in the maximum attraction of the buyer to the
product; while the latter wants as much relevant factual
information, without unnecessary or deceiving puffery, as
possible."
' 3
*Patrick Fitzgerald, Professor of Law, Carleton University, Ottawa
1. Based on a study "Strict Liability in Practice" prepared for the Law
Reform Commission of Canada. Acknowledgments are due to the
personnel in the Department of Consumer and Corporate Affairs and the
Department of Justice for their help and co-operation. Also to my research
assistant, Mrs. B. Fitzgerald.
2. There is, however, the deeper problem that commercial exploitation
through excessive advertising dehumanizes the individual and degrades him
to the level of a mere consumer in order to satisfy the wants of the
producer and seller. On the whole notion of commercial exploitation I
have benefited from some deeply perceptive observations in a forthcoming
study paper by Professor R. A. Samek on Obscenity.
3. Ronald I. Cohen, Misleading Advertising and the Combines
Investigation Act (1969), 15 McGill L.J. 210.
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In an ideal world such a conflict solves itself. For the
market produces an equilibrium. Let the seller's claims outstrip
the truth and demand for his product eventually slumps. The
trouble is, the slump is a long-term affair. In the short run the
buyer needs speedier protection. He needs the protection of the
law.
Also, in the real world the seller-buyer model is too simple,
in at least two different ways. First, advertising in the world of
today is big business. Cohen estimated that by 1969 advertising
in the United States had grown to an eighteen billion dollar
industry, while in Canada it increased 128% between 1954 and
1965.' Secondly, there is more than one party today for the
buyer to contend with. In fact there are three - seller,
advertiser, and media: typically the seller hires an advertising
firm to promote his product on television, radio and so on.
So the consumer needs protection against all three. From
the seller he needs protection against dishonesty and deceit.
From the advertiser he needs protection against manipulation
stultifying freedom of choice. From the media he needs
protection against advertisement pollution.
Of these three needs Canadian law satisfies only the first.
Whereas in the United States "both the informative and
persuasive aspects of the content of any advertisement may be
questioned, in Canada the law deals basically only with false
information." And even this position took time to reach.
Common law history and doctrine show why. The general
attitude of common law was against penalising mere words
alone, as can be seen from the time it took to establish that an
action lies for careless statements. In any case puffery was
always allowed: the huckster had a licence to exaggerate and
the more fool he who fell for the line and agreed to be had. And
goods that failed to live up to the claims made about them were
a matter more for the law of contract than the criminal law,
more a question of word-breaking than of lying.
So the common law view was "buyer beware!" It was up
to the buyer to keep an eye on the seller and see he gave full
weight and full measure. "What is it to the public," asked the
judge in an early case, "whether Richard Webb hath or hath not
4. Cohen, ibid.
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his eighteen gallons of amber beer?" ' But it would be a matter
for the public if the utmost prudence on Richard Webb's part
could not have ensured that he got what he paid for. What if the
seller's weights and measures themselves were false? Against
that sort of trickery no one but a weights and measures
inspector could guard. That sort of trickery was a fraud on the
public itself and was established early on as the crime of public
cheating.
Private cheating too came under the law in due course. For
eventually the offence of obtaining by false pretences came into
the criminal law. Here too, though, the law was still careful
never to penalise mere puffery or breaking your word. The
pretence had always to be one of present and existing fact: the
defendant had to lie. The accent was where it has always
remained - on deception.
Deceptive advertising in Canada today, however, is a
matter for legislation. It is partly dealt with by sections 36 and
37 of the Combines Investigation Act. In an Act dealing almost
exclusively with mergers and monopolies it seems surprising to
find these two sections on an apparently unrelated subject.
Indeed, s. 37 was originally part of the Criminal Code, where it
first appeared in 1914 as s. 406A, then later became and
remained s. 306 till its removal to the Combines Investigation
Act in 1969, originally as s. 33D. One reason for this removal
was its lack of success in the Code. There were few prosecutions
under it, because the police, not being specialists in this area,
preferred to prosecute in areas closer to their own expertise, i.e.
fraud; and there seems to have been only one reported case.
Meanwhile in 1960 s. 33c, later to become s. 36, had been
added to the Act. The reason for the addition, as explained by
Mr. David Henry, 6 serves also to reveal the philosophy behind
the inclusion of the two sections in this Act: "This provision
was inserted after the combines branch had a number of cases
brought to its attention where a vendor, in order to make it
appear that the price at which he was offering an article was
5. R. v. Wbeatley (1761), 2 Burr. 1125; and see Lord Holt C. J. "Shall
we indict one man for making a fool of another?" in Jones (1704), 2 Ld.
Raym. 1013.
6. Mr. Justice Henry was formerly Director of Investigation and
Research, Combines Investigation Act.
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more favourable than was actually the case, misrepresented the
price at which the article was ordinarily sold in the market
generally. Besides being dishonest and likely to mislead the
buying public, this kind of tactics was regarded as unfair as a
basis of competition." 7
Basically s. 36 prohibits misleading advertising with regard
to price and s. 37 is wider and prohibits misleading advertising
generally.' Section 36 prohibits misleading representations to
the public "concerning the price at which such or like articles
have been, are, or will be ordinarily sold", e.g. advertisements
saying "our price $100, regular price $150" when the article is
ordinarily sold for less than $150. S. 37 prohibits, inter alia,
advertisements "containing a statement purporting to be a
statement of fact that is untrue, deceptive or misleading." S. 36
creates a summary offence, s. 37 primarily an indictable one
punishable by five years' imprisonment. Both sections, the
courts have held, create offences of strict liability.9
II
These two sections, then, are the law's main weapons in the war
against misleading advertising. How well have they worked?
First, how have they worked simpliciter?
Misleading advertising is not a departmentally policed area
of law. In this it is unlike weights and measures or food and
drugs, areas where regular routine inspections bring to light
many of the violations that end up in court. Misleading
advertising is virtually self-policing. That is to say, offences
come to the notice of the department primarily through
complaints of consumers or competitors. They are dealt with by
the Misleading Advertising Division of the Combines Branch.
7. Quoted by Cohen, ibid., p. 629.
8. An excellent recent discussion on the law relating to misleading
advertising can be found in "Combines Investigation Act - Misleading
Advertising and Deceptive Practices" in (1972), Ottawa, L.J. 276 by
J. J. Quinlan, Q.C., Director of Investigation and Research, Combines
Investigation Act, Ottawa.
9. R. v. Allied Towers Merchants Limited 119651 2 O.R. 628, 11966]
1 C.C.C. 220, 46 C.P.R. 239; R. v. Firestone Stores Ltd. [1972] O.R.
p. 327, R. v. Imperial Tobacco Products Ltd. [19711 5 W.W.R. 409. In R.
v. Albert Giftwares (not yet reported) the question of mens rea was argued
before the Supreme Court of Canada, but the Supreme Court found it
unnecessary to decide the question for that case.
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There are, in fact, three avenues leading to the investiga-
tion by the department of an instance of misleading advertise-
ment. First, under section 7 any six persons, Canadian citizens,
resident in Canada, of twenty-one or over, may make formal
application to the Director of Investigation and Research for an
inquiry into the matter. Secondly, if the Director has reason to
believe that the Act has been or is about to be violated, he must
cause an inquiry to be made. Thirdly, whenever he is directed
by the Minister of Consumer and Corporate Affairs to inquire
whether there is a violation, he must see that an inquiry is held
(s. 8).
The vast majority of inquiries fall under the second head,
and are made either because the Branch itself has had its eye on
certain practices or merchants or because it has received
complaints about certain advertising practices. The majority
arise from complaints. Indeed, it has been the policy of the
department to do all it could to encourage complaints.
Considerable publicity was devoted to this end. And the
publicity paid off.
Complaints come to the department from consumers, from
competitors and from the Consumer Affairs Bureau. They are
received either by the Trade Practices Branch in Ottawa, by the
departmental regional offices or through Box 99. Since the
introduction of s. 37 in mid-1969, the Misleading Advertising
Division has received 7,500 complaints as of November 1972.
At present the Division is receiving 250 complaints a month
about misleading advertising only. About 300 cases have led to
charges under ss. 36 and 37 during the period and the majority
of prosecutions have been successful.
Another gauge of the size of the problem is the number of
files opened each month in the departmental filing office. Each
file relates to a complaint that has to be examined. In March,
1972, the number of files opened was 304. In April it was 262.
In May, 304. And these were fairly average months repeating
much the pattern of the last two years' overall trend.
So the volume of complaints - what we might call the case
load - is high. The same can't be said for the human resources
that have to cope with it. Without going into too much detail
about the administration of the department, it is easy to see
that the key person, when it comes to working out how many
of the complaints can be dealt with and to what degree, is the
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investigator. But the number of investigators across Canada is
only twenty-one. It is clear, then, that scarcity of human
resources is a crucial limiting factor as regards the processing of
complaints and cases under the two sections.
For this reason the Combines Branch has been forced to
take stock and articulate for itself a policy to follow. All the
complaints must be looked into, in order to see if there is any
substance in them. Investigation to this level, however, needn't
cause undue strain on resources. The majority of complaints
may well turn out to have little or no substance in them, or at
least not to be worth pursuing further. For example, a scrutiny
of relevant files revealed the following picture:
Files closed without action, because pr-
eliminary investigation revealed no sub-
stance ............................ 1767
Files closed without court action after full
investigation ....................... 1208
Files closed after court action ......... 167
Total ............................. 3142
While the prosecution cases form the biggest burden,
especially in view of the evidentiary requirements regarding
ordinary and regular price, investigation even only to the level
resulting in closing the file without court action but after full
investigation can be very time consuming. Added to this the
Branch shoulders another, perhaps equally heavy, burden - a
burden of an "educational" kind.
In addition to processing complaints and conducting
inquiries the Branch also has been giving attention to the
promotion of voluntary compliance. The programme of
compliance is intended to be a vigorous and sustained
programme involving education and explanation, discussion of
business problems and the giving of opinions concerning the
application of the Act. Businessmen are encouraged to discuss
their problems with the department before they decide to
introduce policies which might prove to be in conflict with the
Act, and the Director and his staff study matters businessmen
submit to them and indicate whether or not the adoption of
proposed plans would lead the Director to launch an inquiry. As
part of the programme of compliance senior staff members
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undertake speaking engagements before trade associations and
other business societies.
Clearly, then, without some policy of selection with
respect to prosecutions, departmental resources would be
strained beyond capacity. As the departmental handout dated
June, 1972,10 puts it, staff resources which can be made
available to investigate complaints are not unlimited. In order to
meet the objectives of bringing about an overall improvement in
the quality of market information directed to consumers, it will
be necessary to concentrate in the selection of cases on those
which are most likely to contribute to the objectives sought by
the legislation. The principles followed in assessing the priority
of complaints are the degree of coverage of the advertisement,
the impact of the advertisement on the public, the deterrent
effect of a successful prosecution and the selection of the best
cases to allow the courts to establish new principles and clarify
the law.
Selectivity, then, is manifestly part of departmental policy
and is publicly articulated as such. To a lawyer, however, it is
worth notice that of the four principles mentioned above not
one is immediately and obviously concerned with the absence
of mens rea. There is no public statement to the effect that
offenders whose offence arises simply from error, inadvertence
or mistake will not be prosecuted.
III
Empirical inquiry, however, showed a different picture.
Research was undertaken to ascertain how far the lack of mens
rea on the defendant's part led to a Branch decision not to
prosecute.'1 The research was carried out primarily through a
survey of departmental files, which enabled a comparison to be
10. Departmental News sheet, June 1972, p. 3.
11. Research was undertaken for the Law Reform Commission to
discover how strictly the strict liability criminal law was enforced in the
areas of misleading advertising, weights and measures, and food and drugs.
It should be stressed that any conclusions in this paper are solely those
arrived at in the research and are not to be taken necessarily as accepted
by the Department.
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made between prosecuted and non-prosecuted cases.'lA A
survey was also made of files dosed after preliminary
investigation revealed that there was no substance in the
complaint. And detailed discussions were held with all members
of the Branch involved in taking the decision to prosecute or
not to prosecute.
Out of files containing cases fully investigated we
compared 100 prosecuted cases with 100 non-prosecuted cases.
S. 36 accounted for 35 cases in each category, s. 37 for 65. The
cases broke down as follows:
S. 36 Prosecuted
Excuse of mistake not given ........... 26
Excuse of mistake given -
not accepted by Branch ...... 7
accepted by Branch ......... 2
(both prosecuted and both
pleaded guilty) .............. 9
T otal ............................. 35
S. 36 Non-prosecuted
Cases dropped for reasons other than
mistake (e.g. lapse of time, insufficient
evidence) ......................... 28
Cases where mistake seemed to be the
only factor ......................... 3
Cases where there was mistake and the
advertiser had sought to remedy the harm
by satisfying the complaining customer or
by rectifying the advertisement or both . . 4
T otal ............................. 35
1 1A The total number of prosecuted cases linked for the period September
1970 - May 1972 was compared with a random sample of non-prosecuted
cases for the same period.
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S. 37 Prosecuted
Excuse of mistake not given ........... 51
Excuse of mistake given -
not accepted by Branch ...... 12
accepted by Branch ......... 2
(both prosecuted: one pleaded
guilty, the other prosecution
was withdrawn) ............. 14
T otal ............................. 65
S. 3 7 Non-prosecuted
Cases dropped for reasons other than
m istake .......................... 46
Cases where mistake seemed the only
factor ............................. 5
Cases where "remedying the harm"
seemed the only factor ................ 3
Cases of mistake together with
"remedying the harm" .. ............... 11
Total .............................. 65
These results suggested that where there is no fault there is
no prosecution. Complete support is lacking, however, on
account of three counter-examples - two under s. 36 and one
under s. 37. The latter seemed explicable from the files: the
claim was extravagant, the defendant was the original importer,
and the foreign seller whose word he claimed to have relied on
could not be prosecuted. Of the other two cases, the ones under
s. 36, neither could be squared with the "no fault - no
prosecution" hypothesis. So the finding was not there there is a
100% correlation between absence of fault and absence of
prosecution, but that there is a high degree of correlation.
To test further the hypothesis that such a correlation
exists we did two things. First we further analysed all the "no
fault" cases and discussed them thoroughly with the Branch
personnel to find out how far lack of fault was or was not a real
factor in arriving at the decision. Secondly we made a sample
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survey of files closed immediately after preliminary investiga-
tion because there was no substance in the complaint.
Our further analysis and discussion was revealing. Our
conclusion was that mistake played a lesser role than we had
imagined. On the other hand, if we widened the concept of "no
moral fault" to cover all cases where for some reason or other it
might be true that the seller or advertiser was not really being
dishonest, then the hypothesis that the Director's staff were not
inclined to prosecute cases involving no moral fault seemed to
stand up. l" Of the hundred non-prosecuted cases (ss. 36 and
37) 47 were cases where "no fault" in this wider definition was
argued and the remainder were cases where "no fault" was not
argued and other factors prevented prosecution. Of the 47 cases
where "no fault" was argued, 38 seem not to have been
prosecuted because of this lack of fault and 9 because of other
factors.
Non-prosecuted cases under ss. 36-3 7,
wbere "no fault" was argued:
M istake ................. 5
Mistake & cooperation ..... 5
Reasons Mistake & other factors .... 6
for not Trivial matter ............ 5
prose- Cooperation ............. 3
cuting Cooperation & other factors
(other than mistake) 14
Other factors ............. 4
No offence .............. 5
T otal ............................. 47
Accordingly, the survey and detailed analysis shows that:
(1) out of 200 cases in total the number of cases where "no
fault" in a wider sense is raised is 71 - 35%; (2) out of 100
prosecuted cases "no fault" is raised in 24 cases - 24%; (3) out
of 100 non-prosecuted cases "no fault" is raised in 47 cases -
47%; (4) out of this 100 the number of cases not prosecuted
partly because of "no fault" in a wider sense is 38 - 38%.
12. This conclusion is parallel to that of the study by Hadden and
Fitzgerald on the Factories Act in England: see Law Commission Working
Paper 30: Strict Liability and the Enforcement of the Factories Act 1961.
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In conclusion, "no fault" in this wider sense is a factor in
the decision. On the other hand, if we narrow the areas of those
cases where "no fault" in the wider sense was the only factor,
then we find that the total of non-prosecuted cases was only 13.
This makes good sense in view of the law-enforcer's
perennial problem of scarce resources. This problem, though
often invisible to the lawyer, is the all-important one to the
law-enforcer. A legal researcher is naturally inclined to view the
problem from the point of view of possible defences and to
focus attention on the question of presence or absence of fault.
Discussion with the Director and his staff, however, drew our
attention to the quite different considerations which they, as
administrators, have to take into account also - considerations
which are obvious and based on common sense but which are
easily lost sight of in a jurisprudential inquiry. For bearing in
mind the extremely limited resources of the Director's staff,
one realises that uppermost in their minds must be the question
whether a particular prosecution justifies its cost in terms of
time, money, etc. This is why in some of the cases it was
decided, however clearly an offence had been committed, that
the triviality of the matter was such that it did not justify
prosecuting. In our sample at least five cases fell clearly into this
category. Moreover, we felt that there were others where,
although this was nowhere spelt out and recorded, the same
consideration applied. For the impression we got from the staff
was that one of the overriding factors in applying and enforcing
this area of law was the degree of harm caused by the
misleading advertisement and the degree to which the public
needed protection. And just as in ordinary law the gravity of an
offence appears to be gauged partly by the amount of actual
harm done and the "wickedness of intent" on the part of the
defendant, so here too the seriousness of the matter seems to be
measured partly by the extent of actual harm done and the
degree of dishonesty on the advertiser's part. So the less
dishonest the advertiser, the more likely is the staff to regard
the matter as not warranting prosecution.
This is partly common sense. It is partly also a result of the
social reaction to offences committed "without fault" and
above all of the reaction of courts. In this scarce resources
operation the staff are highly concerned, as they made clear to
us, to preserve their credibility in the courts. To "waste time"
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prosecuting cases where the defendant was clearly in no way
dishonest would do little to present the courts with the image
of a Department seriously concerned with important and "real"
offences. Indeed, two cases of our sample of 71 "no fault" cases
bear this out. In one the court appears to have acquitted
(wrongly surely from a strictly legal point of view) on account
of the absence of fault. In the other the court convicted but
considered the matter trivial and gave a minimum penalty.
The sample survey of files closed immediately was also
revealing. Before examining these files we had a discussion with
the staff member solely responsible for the cases at this stage.
He gave us to understand that almost half the files are closed
because they are without substance and that the rest divide
equally into those where there is insufficient evidence, where
there is no fault on the advertiser's part, and where other action
is more appropriate. The first half tend to be closed
immediately, the second half after further information is
received.
Inspection of the filing indexes and records revealed that
by the end of the period under investigation about 3,700 files
had been closed after preliminary investigation. We decided to
survey a sample of 100 of these files. Accordingly, we took a
randomised selection of one in 37 files. Our survey gave us the
following figures:
Cases without substance .............. 46
insufficient evidence ................. 12
Other action more appropriate ......... 14
Other factors (e.g. out of time) ......... 12
84
Mistake or improvement by defendant .. 10
Customer satisfied ................... 3
No further advertisement ............. 3
16
Total ............................. 100
Our conclusion from these figures was that if we group the
last three figures together there is a small yet sizable quantity of
cases closed at this initial stage because the investigator or
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administrator thinks that the lack of fault means that use of
resources would not be justified in prosecuting. This was not
out of line with our findings on the main survey and the
detailed analysis. "No fault" does play some part in the decision
not to forward a case for prosecution. It does not, however,
play a conclusive part. Added to other factors it can render a
case "not worth prosecuting". By itself it may not suffice, as is
shown by the main counter-example to our thesis. On the other
hand a tendency in the Director's staff not to prosecute if the
defendant is not really being dishonest is clearly established.
Equally, it is submitted, it is self-evidently justified. The object
of the staff is to prevent fraud to the public and to ensure
truthful advertising. This is an object best secured by education
and enlisting the cooperation of advertisers rather than by too
officious policing of the Act. A "strict liability administration"
of the Act would be as costly as it would be counterproductive,
it seems.
IV
How well have the sections worked? How successful have they
been? First, what is the measure of success? The number of
complaints received? The number fully investigated? Or the
number prosecuted? Or is it the view the Branch takes of its
work and its programme? Or the view taken by traders? Or the
view taken by the consumer?
At a simple level we can state that the sections have
worked to this extent, that a considerable number of
complaints were received which would not have been so
received in the absence of the Department of Consumer and
Corporate Affairs' programme, that a whole lot of cases were
fully investigated that would not otherwise have been, and that
one hundred and sixty-seven cases were prosecuted that
otherwise wouldn't have come to court. In other words the
programme was put into operation. But has it done any good?
Again, we have to determine first how to measure this. To
one who holds to the retributive ideal, presumably the fact that
a number of firms were punished for wrongdoing would itself
show that good had been done. The rest of us would want some
other evidence - evidence that those firms had improved their
practices, that other firms had been deterred by the examples
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made of those prosecuted, and that the standard of advertising
generally had gone up.
On this no full empirical investigation has yet been done.
All we have so far is impressionistic evidence acquired partly
from personal observation, partly from discussions with the
three interests involved, the Branch, the traders and the
Consumer Association of Canada.
Personal observation suggests that traders and dealers are
taking increasing care to ensure that their goods and services live
up to the promise contained in their advertisements. It is
notable, for instance, how thoroughly a firm will check up on
an advertisement or representation when faced with a complaint
that it hasn't been honoured. And it is notable how far firms
will go to satisfy customers' complaints. Noteworthy too is the
frequency in the newspapers of published corrections to
advertisements, often advertisements of the previous day. On
the other hand, personal observation is inevitably limited, and
in any case even if it gives an accurate picture how can we be
sure that such improvements are due to the misleading
advertising laws? Might they not have occurred anyway?
Discussions with the Branch too suggested the sections had
brought improvements. Admittedly those in charge of a
programme have a natural inclination to regard it as succeeding.
Against this it must be remembered that through its investiga-
tions and its programme of education and compliance the
Branch gains a far wider and more comprehensive picture of the
whole field than anyone else can secure. Their conclusion is that
traders are taking more care and part of their evidence for this is
the number of traders seeking advice from the Branch before
launching promotions and advertising programmes and the
number showing eagerness to comply with Branch suggestions
for improvements to safeguard their advertisements from
inaccuracy. Besides, we must remember that many of the
complaints to Box 99 come not from consumers but from
competitors. For false advertising is seen - and was meant to be
seen - as not only unfair to the consumer but also as unfair to
competitors, as an unfair trading practice. So it does seem as
though consumers and competitors are keeping traders on their
toes.
Retailers certainly give this impression. Discussions with
certain retailers and the Retail Council of Canada indicate that
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the law has forced retailers to make extensive modifications to
their advertising. Indeed retailers are not wholly displeased at
this. Basically our impression is that as well as maximising
profits they are also keen to give value and that any
developments that help them improve or maintain standards are
not unwelcome. There is also evidence, however, of anxiety in
the trade arising from the fact that the offences under the two
sections are offences of strict liability. The possibility of a gaol
sentence for something done by error or mistake they find
alarming. Nor do they subscribe fully to the conclusions of our
survey, that by and large offenders without fault are not
prosecuted. By contrast, they point to the Weights and
Measures and the Food and Drugs legislation, which is also strict
liability law but which is operated so as to incorporate in
practice a highly articulated warning system, whereby (in
general) prosecutions are only taken against those who are
deliberately and knowingly violating the law or against those
who are negligent because they have already been adequately
warned by the inspector. This system the representatives of the
retailers seemed to find quite unobjectionable. They only
wished some similar feature could be written into the
misleading advertising law.
The same can't be said of the consumer. According to
discussions with the Consumer Association the fact that the
offences under the two sections are offences of strict liability is
by no means objectionable. For the consumer's main interest is
that advertisements should be correct and accurate. He has no
concern with the question whether inaccuracies are due to
accident, mistake, carelessness or dishonesty. To him they are
all inaccuracies - inaccuracies against which he wants to be
protected and against which he is confident that the misleading
advertising law and the Branch's programme is protecting him.
In his view any improvement in advertising is wholly due to this
very programme.' l  The sections are protecting him against
harm.
13. A recent opinion poll reported in the Ottawa Citizen September
22, 1973, suggests that there is little public confidence that advertising is
more truthful now than it was. Of 700 adults personally interviewed across
Canada in July, 43% thought most advertising was less truthful today than
it was five years ago, 25% thought it was more truthful, 25% thought it
was the same and 7% didn't know.
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This, however, prompts a reconsideration of the whole
concept of the "welfare" offence. The conventional wisdom
about such offences is that we need them to protect the public
against negligence and inefficiency in trade and that this
protection is well secured by prosecuting offences in the
criminal courts. In such offences, then, the prime consideration
is the harm done to the public. It doesn't really matter whether
or not the defendant has been at fault. Whatever his moral
culpability, it has no bearing whatsoever on the damage done to
the consumer.
There is a parallel argument about road accidents. If I am
run down and injured, what does it matter that the driver was
not negligent? Does it lessen my injuries? Does it diminish my
need for compensation? Blame and negligence have no place in
the law of road accidents. All that matters is that I get my
compensation. In other words, the driver - or society - must
be made the insurer of the victim's injuries.
What this suggests is not so much that drivers must be
subject to strict liability, but that the whole subject must be
removed from the area of tort. Likewise, the emphasis on harm
to the public in the welfare offence discussions suggests, not
that such offences should be offences of strict liability, but that
they should be expunged from the criminal law. For in these
cases too the main question is not "was the defendant at fault?"
but "how can we prevent or undo the harm?"
Does prosecuting offenders do it? Is it the best way of
doing it? Practice shows that law enforcers don't necessarily
think so. Basically there are two objectives: (a) to prevent harm,
and (b) to undo such harm as has been done. As regards (a) law
enforcers seem to rely less on prosecution and more on (1)
education and (2) enforcement remedies. Admittedly education
derives some - though not all - of its force from the support of
criminal sanctions. On the other hand, the superiority of
enforcement remedies over the ordinary criminal sanctions is
striking. All that the latter can do is punish the defendant for
his wrongdoing in the hope of teaching him a lesson and giving
an example to others for the future. Enforcement remedies by
contrast deal immediately with the harmful situation: the faulty
scale can be sealed against use, the adulterated meat seized, the
deceptive labels stickered and so on. Such remedies allow the
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inspector to concentrate on the prime objective: getting rid of
the danger or harm.
But what about (b), cases where the harm has already been
done? What about the store that has already sold short weight?
How else can we deal with this than by the criminal law? The
snag here, though, in practice, is that conviction only derives its
full force from publicity.
A similar problem arises in misleading advertising because
there would be little point in impounding the advertisements
after they have gone out and misled the public. You can seize
wrong and deceptive labels even if it means putting a firm out
of business. You can impound products. In other areas of life
you can take analogous action, e.g. you can cut a non-payer off
the telephone or the electricity. And the law tries (without
success) to cut bad drivers off the road. But what can you do to
cut misleading advertisers off from their advertisements?
This brings us to the whole question of techniques of
enforcement. While there is no doubt that the whole misleading
advertising programme has all the marks of being a successful
one, we were nevertheless struck by the fact that the weapons
available to the law enforcers in this area are far inferior to
those available to the Food and Drugs and the Weights and
Measures inspectors. Indubitably part of the reason for the
success of law enforcement in these areas is the power the
inspectors have to take enforcement action by way of seizure,
sealing, and so forth. In misleading advertising there is no real
analogue.
The nearest approach is the Prohibition Order. This indeed
has been highly successful and is greatly feared by all
defendants. The reasons for this fear are partly that the order
speaks to individuals so that whereas normally conviction
results in a fine, disobedience to a prohibition order can land
the directors in gaol. Another reason is the extent of the order
in terms of space and time. The order can be unlimited in
respect of time and can affect the operations of a whole chain
of stores, i.e. the total operation of a company. Our
understanding was that the existence of an order against a firm
really made it make sure it was careful.
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Finally, some general but very tentative suggestions. They are
put forward for exploration and as pointers to further research
rather than as definite conclusions.
(1) Perhaps the law of misleading advertising is con-
centrating on the wrong party. The law and its enforcement sees
as its prime target the advertiser. Special defences of good faith
are afforded to the publisher, and cases against publishers seem
rare. Yet could we not consider it this way? The publisher,
especially a television station, radio company or newspaper
makes an enormous revenue out of advertising. In other words
he is hugely paid for pumping out a continuous streak of
information, some of it misleading and injurious to the public,
yet he himself is saddled it seems with no responsibility
whatsoever for the accuracy of its concents. Yet the freedom of
the air - what Lord Thompson has called a licence to print
your own money - is a uniquely valuable possession. Can it not
be argued that society, in allowing a television or radio
company the privilege of broadcasting, has a right to put a duty
on that company to see to it that all its material, advertisements
not excepted, are accurate? If we really were serious' 4 about
wanting to put an end to deceptive advertising, wouldn't the
first step be to insist that such publishers bear absolute
responsibility for advertising content?
(2) This by no means entails that publishers would be
subject to strict liability regulations in the criminal law,
however. What it does mean, or could mean, is something far
more effective. For the procedure appropriate to deal with
deceptive or misleading advertising may well not be criminal
proceedings at all. For consider the case of a television
commercial repeated ad nauseam and totally misleading. Surely
the only adequate remedy for this is something that will wholly
undo the harm by completely removing the false impression
that the advertisement has created in the minds of the public.
And the step that will do this is certainly not that of criminal
prosecution. It can only be something by way of counter-
advertisement. In other words the suggestion is that where a
14. Not that the Department is not very serious; nor has its programme
been without success, to judge from discussions with the Consumer
Association of Canada.
264 The Dalhousie Law Journal
publisher has (whether with or without fault) published
misleading advertisements, he be bound to publish denials
together with the true facts in such manner as will most
effectively counter the wrong impression created.
(3) Of course much scope for argument would arise as to
what would be enough to be effective, and one can imagine
publishers making token denials and leaving it at that. But the
law already has an example to follow. We already have the law
of libel and the remedy whereby the defendant has to issue an
apology in terms demanded by the plaintiff or else required by
the court. What is suggested here is that the misleading
advertising branch could set up a monitoring section to
scrutinise the accuracy of advertisements partly on a sample
basis and partly following up consumer and competitor
complaints, and could also settle the terms, manner and so forth
of the denial or counter-advertisement required.
(4) So far as the actual advertiser is concerned, to some
extent the responsibility of the publisher would have its
undoubted repercussions on him too. But he too could be
required to issue counter-advertisements.
(5) A further possible penalty for both publisher and
advertiser (though of a non-criminal kind) could be to be
debarred from advertising. Again the law provides an example.
Vexatious litigants can be debarred from the right to bring
actions in the courts, not so much because they are at fault as
because they are (perhaps without any malice on their part)
simple wasting everyone's time. An advertiser or publisher who
is simply misleading everyone (even with the best intentions)
could surely be reasonably debarred for a time at least from
being able to advertise his products within a prescribed area.
(6) The only remaining function for the criminal law here
would be of supporting enforcement. The publisher, advertiser
or trader who flouts the seizure, sealing or order to
"counter-advertise" is wilfully disobeying authority. With him
the ordinary criminal law can rightfully deal.
